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Abstract
We develop a model of waiting lists for public hospitals when physi-
cians deliver both private and public treatment. Public treatment is
free but rationed, i.e., only cases meeting some medical criteria area
admitted for treatment. Private treatment has no waiting time but
entails payment of a fee. Both physicians and patients take into ac-
count that each patient treated in the private practice schedule reduces
the waiting list for public treatment. We show that physicians do not
necessarily select the mildest cases from the waiting list. We provide
su–cient conditions on the rationing policy under which cream skim-
ming is always partial. We show that, to a large extent, one can by-
pass the analysis of doctors’ behavior in the characterization of patient
selection.
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1 Introduction
The existence of waiting lists is a main feature of several health systems.
This phenomenon has been studied as a means to control demand when price
cannot be used as a rationing device, either for ethical or political reasons.1
Waiting lists and their associated waiting time are much more important
in the public than in the private sector. For instance, Bosanquet (1999)
states, for the U.K., that \at present, there is underocupation in private
hospitals, with occupancy rates at 50% or less," while Laing and Buisson
(1992) report that "there is no evidence that the National Health Service
(NHS) [in the UK] consultants are short of time to do their private work"
and that \they do not have waiting lists for private surgery even in London,
where the ratio of private to NHS work is highest."2
On the contrary, waiting lists in the public sector may be quite long.
For instance, waiting time in the UK for hip replacement could be as long
as 2 years in 1987. Due to this, some patients are willing to pay for (almost
immediate) treatment in the private sector. For instance, 20% of elective
hart surgery and 30% of hip replacements in the UK were conducted in the
private sector in 1995.
We focus our analysis on non-urgent treatments for a flxed specialty,
e.g., elective heart surgery. It is then justifled to assume that patients are
treated on a flrst-come/flrst-served basis (i.e., that they are not prioritized
by severity). Although there exists an extensive informal as well as the-
oretical literature on prioritization (see again Cullis, Jones and Propper’s
survey), a large proportion of this literature deals with prioritization across
specialties.3 Notice also that prioritization schemes vary widely from one
1See the survey by Cullis, Jones, and Propper (forthcoming) for an overview on both
the empirical and the theoretical literature on hospital waiting lists.
2On a more informal note, Richmond (1996) also reports that when John Yates, author
of a book on the interaction of the NHS with the private sector (Yates, 1995), telephoned
18 orthopedic surgeons in the Fall of 1995 \to seek an appointment as a NHS patient;
only 4 could see him within 3 months, and for 7 of them the wait was between 6 months
and 2 years. He then called as a private patient; 2 did not see private patients but the
remaining 16 ofiered an appointment within 1 to 7 weeks; the average wait was 3.5 weeks,
even though some consultants were on holiday."
3See, for instance, Coast (1996) on the Oregon Plan and the New Zealand Core Services
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country’s (or even region’s) health system to the other. Difierent weights are
given to distinct criteria such as expected deterioration of health status in
the absence of hospital treatment, expected improvement after treatment,
number of economic dependents, possibility to afiord the alternative pri-
vate care, current health status, age, and so on. The casuistics would make
it very di–cult to derive general conclusions. In this respect, Goddard and
Tavakoli (1994) compare three alternative regimes in terms of the associated
waiting times and their consequences for equity: (i) flrst-come/flrst-served,
(ii) prioritize in proportion of severity, and (iii) high priority to the more
severe cases while imposing long waits to the less serious ill. These authors,
however, do not consider the possibility of resorting to private practice. No-
tice that the choice between waiting in the public sector and paying in the
private sector is very much blurred if patients in the public waiting list for
a given specialty are prioritized.4 Examples of non-urgent treatments with
long waiting lists are, apart from the two examples already cited, the surgery
of cataracts, herniae, varicose veins, or hemorrhoids.
A common feature of countries with public health services and waiting
lists, is that there is co-existence, in the same doctor, of private and public
practice. In particular, the South of Europe seems to have a higher intensity
of this phenomenon, although it is present also in the UK. For instance,
Richmond (1996) reports that \except in the poorest parts of Britain, there
is one private hospital within a mile of every major district general hospital
and this in turn means that consultant surgeons can easily gallop down
the road and operate on their private patients." In fact, whenever we flnd
some sort of public infrastructure with doctors, these same doctors also
maintain some private practice. These two features, signiflcant waiting lists
in the public sector and doctors acting in both private and public sectors,
raise a basic concern. The private sector may only ofier treatment to the
easiest (mildest) cases. That is, patient selection (cream skimming) may
List.
4As an illustration, in section 4.2 we discuss the efiects of a simple prioritization scheme
in the spirit of case (iii) in Goddard and Tavakoli (1994).
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exist. Notice that the actual cream skimming actions (e.g., the rejection
of patients who prefer the private sector) may not really take place at all.
This may be for two reasons. First, doctors may set their private o–ces and
equipment so that only certain health problems may be treated.5 Second,
if patients know their own health status because some previous tests have
been carried out, only those patients who know they will be accepted request
treatment in the private sector.6
Notice that the larger the segment of patients that are admitted to (or
that can be treated in) the private sector, the shorter the segment of pa-
tients that remains for the public waiting list. Therefore, our concern with
patient selection leads consideration of a supply-side model of waiting lists.
It contrasts with most health economics literature, which looks essentially
at demand-side determinants of the waiting list. There are some excep-
tions. Iversen (1993) analyzes the political game that hospitals and the
Government play. If hospitals act as Stackelberg leaders, they may have an
incentive to maintain longer waiting lists. The same author (Iversen, 1997)
shows that cost savings concerns can also lead hospitals to maintain longer
waiting lists in the presence of a private sector: longer waiting lists induce
a shift of patients towards the private sector. Notice that, in both articles,
waiting list length is never a choice variable of doctors.
Both Iversen (1997) and Goddard, Malek and Tavakoli (1995) concen-
trate on the patients’ decisions. Both papers assume that all patients who
are willing to pay for private treatment are served in the private sector.
Therefore, they directly rule out the possibility of cream skimming on the
part of the doctors. In fact, both authors treat doctors’ decisions in a sim-
ple way, while doctor’s strategic behavior plays an important role in our
supply-side argument. Thus, our analysis is complementary to theirs.
More speciflcally, Goddard, Malek and Tavakoli (1995) develop a model
5Richmond (1996), when describing the private practice, reports that \many diagnostic
procedures have to be done in the NHS facility, and post-operative complications, although
rare, may require an ambulance ride to the NHS hospital."
6The issue of patient selection also arises in other circumstances. See the editorial of
the Economist (1998), which addresses the criticisms directed towards health maintenance
organizations in the U.S. for excluding costly cases.
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with a speciflc functional form for the patient’s utility that allows for in-
come efiects. Their emphasis is on developing comparative statics results
for changes in the alternative treatment quality, the time discount rate, and
other economic variables. The private supply side is determined exogenously
by the number of patients that the private hospital is able to treat per pe-
riod. Equilibrium determines simultaneously the price for treatment and
the duration of wait in the public health service.
Another common feature of public health systems is the existence of ra-
tioning. That is, only the more severe cases are allowed access to public hos-
pital treatment, while other patients are ofiered an alternative non-hospital
treatment, like medication. For instance, if the parameter measuring visual
acuity runs from zero to one, public cataract surgery may be rationed by
excluding patients with more than 0.5 acuity (as it is the case in the public
health system of the Vasc Country).
In general, this policy divides the population into two groups. One group
is formed by all individuals who satisfy the admission requirement (visual
acuity below 0.5 in the previous example). The other group is formed by
all individuals who are denied access to the public waiting list and who
must resort to either another type of treatment, or to the private hospital
treatment.
We must point out that our analysis is not devoted to flnding the optimal
rationing policy. We rather take the rationing policy as given and analyze
how the opportunities for cream skimming are afiected by changes in the
rationing policy. That is, our analysis is positive in nature, rather than
normative.
We concentrate our analysis to the segment of patients who are admitted
to the public waiting list. Therefore, all our cream-skimming deflnitions are
made in reference to this segment. Thus, we deflne full cream skimming as
the situation where all the mildest patients out of those who were admitted
in the waiting list end up being treated in the private sector. Partial cream
skimming, on the other hand, is the situation in which doctors treat, in their
private practice, patients with an intermediate range (again in reference to
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the segment of admitted patients) of illness severities. Our most important
result is that full cream skimming is only compatible with intermediate
rationing policies. If, on the contrary, rationing is either very lax or very
stringent then cream skimming will always be partial.
Surprisingly, the only assumption on doctors’ preferences needed for this
result is that, if doctors are willing to treat a case with a certain severity
level, then doctors are also willing to treat any case with lower severity.
Therefore, our analysis is consistent with doctors who care about patients’
welfare. Our restriction would mean in this case that treatment costs rise
su–ciently fast with severity. That is, cost saving motives linked to flnancial
viability may be behind the observed cream-skimming behaviour.7 Similarly,
with respect to the queueing process, the only condition we impose is that
the waiting list be governed by the flrst-come/flrst-served rule.
The intuition behind our main results is the following. For a very strict
rationing policy, only the most severe cases are admitted. This induces
short waiting lists. Consequently, the private sector becomes less attractive.
People will be willing to wait in order to save the private sector fee.
If, on the other hand, even mild cases are admitted in the waiting list,
that is, rationing is quite lax, then again cream skimming will be only par-
tial. However, the reason is quite difierent from the previous one. With a
loose rationing criterion, many people are admitted in the waiting list. The
waiting list will be long. Nonetheless, since there are patients in the waiting
list with mild conditions, these patients will be willing to wait, because their
cost of doing so is small.
We also show, by means of a numerical example, that one cannot in
general ascertain whether private practice serves a population with a higher
or a smaller average illness severity than the population that remains in the
waiting list. Only in the particular case when cream skimming is full we
know that the private sector treats a lower average severity.
7Our model difiers considerably from the Feldstein-Pauly argument (Feldstein, 1970;
Pauly, 1980) which states that doctors want to have a list from which they pick the most
interesting cases.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model.
In Section 3, we provide the conditions that ensure that cream skimming
is always partial, and characterize the equilibrium with cream skimming.
Next, we characterize the equilibrium with cream skimming when the afore-
mentioned conditions do not hold. In Section 4, we provide the numerical
example and discusses the efiects of a simple prioritization scheme on the
equilibrium level of cream skimming. In Section 5, we make some flnal re-
marks. The proofs of the lemmata are relegated to the appendix while the
proofs of the propositions are kept in the main text.
2 The Model
There exists a continuum of patients with mass m. Each patient is charac-
terized by an index of severity m 2 [0;m] and by his initial wealth a 2 [0; a].
The index m and the initial wealth a are distributed independently. The
density of m is h(m) = 1 (uniform) and the density of a is g(a) with mean
a0. Hence, the joint density is given by f(m; a) = g(a). The flnal utility of
a patient is given by eV (w; x;m) = x ¡ ec(w;m), where w is the amount of
time that the patient expects to wait from the moment he becomes ill until
his discharge from the hospital and x is the flnal wealth of the individual.
That is, if s is the cost of treatment, then the utility of a patient of type
(m; a) is given by a¡s¡ec(w;m). Since we restrict our attention to a speciflc
illness or specialty, the assumption that the fee s is independent of severity
is justifled. Each severity m generates an arrival process of new patients
seeking admittance to the public hospital that is also independent of initial
wealth. We do not model explicitly the arrival process.8
Once a patient is admitted for public hospital treatment, he may be
ofiered the possibility to resort to a private treatment. Moreover, as an
outside option, an alternative non-hospital treatment exists with treatment
cost equal to s0 ‚ 0. For instance, if the non-hospital treatment is public
then s0 = 0. The non-hospital treatment cures the patient after a length of
8See Worthington (1987, 1991) on this.
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time equal to t.
A single public hospital must serve two types of agents: those patients
that are elligible for public treatment and prefer it over the private treat-
ment, and those patients who, although they prefer (or are willing to pay
for) the private treatment, they are not ofiered that option.9 The set of all
patients admitted to the public waiting list is referred to as the total calling
population, which we denote by ›. A patient with severity m has associated
service time (that is, the time elapsed between admission into the hospital
and discharge) ¿(m). We do not impose any restrictions on the function ¿
other than it must take positive values. (For instance, if cesarean section has
a shorter service time than natural birth, one could say that ¿ is decreasing
in the severity index.)
We assume that there is no idle time during public-treatment hours.
Therefore, the time t that is necessary necessary to treat all patients in the
set › is given by
t =
Z a
0
Z
m2›
¿(m)f(m; a)dm =
Z
m2›
¿(m)dm, (1)
whenever this integral is well deflned. Let T (z) · R z0 ¿(z0)dz0 be an auxiliary
function. It denotes the time to treat all patients with severity distributed
in the interval [0; z].
The expected waiting time for any patient with severity m is a function
of t and m, which we denote by G(t;m). The form of the function G depends
on the process of arrival of patients.10 For instance, in the discrete case, if
all patients in › arrive at the beginning of the period in a random order,
i.e., independently of their severity, then G(t;m) = ¿(m) + t=2. As patients
become atomistic, this reduces to G(t;m) = t=2. Other possibilities can
be considered. The only requirement we impose is that G be a one-to-one
mapping.
We can re-deflne the patients’ utility function as follows. Let c(t;m) ·ec(G(t;m);m), that is, the total wait in the public sector enters directly into
9This will be an equilibrium feature of the model. It is not an assumption.
10The arrival process of patients is assumed to be independent of severity.
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the utility function. Similarly, let V (t; x;m) · x ¡ c(t;m). Since there is
a one-to-one relationship between expected waiting time and the total wait
in the public sector, t, we refer to the flrst argument of the utility function
as waiting time in the remainder. We use the following assumptions on the
function c.
Assumption 1
@c
@t
> 0;
@c
@m
> 0; and c(t;m) is continuous and twice difierentiable:
We require that utility cost be increasing in both waiting time and sever-
ity. Also, it would be natural to think that marginal cost of waiting is in-
creasing in the illness severity. This would ensure that the more severe the
condition of a patient is, the more he is willing to pay for a reduction in the
waiting time. Nonetheless, we do not need to impose this.
An important assumption is the following.
Assumption 2
c(0;m) = c(t; 0) = 0;8t and 8m 2 [0;m]:
In other words, we are assuming that waiting time measures the wait
until full recovery (so that c(0;m) = 0 for all m) and that a patient with
severity m = 0 is not ill (so that c(t; 0) = 0 for all t). This also implies
that the wait itself does not cause any direct disutility other than having
to put up with the illness during that period. Hence, almost no disutility
is sufiered if a patient is almost not ill. For a discussion on the difierence
between the direct disutility caused by queueing and the disutility caused
by waiting for a cure, see Propper (1995).
The public hospital and its equipment are owned and run by the public
health system. The speciflc contracts that align the government’s objectives
with those of the hospital managers are ignored here.
The advantage of being treated in the private practice is that waiting
time is smaller. We assume, for simplicity, that waiting time in the private
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practice is zero. The advantage of being treated in the public practice is
that the treatment is free, whereas the private practice costs s > 0 to the
patient. Consequently, even if the patient has ex-ante contracted some pri-
vate insurance, the actual payment if treatment is received is positive. This
allows to accommodate in our framework diverse institutional settings. The
existence of a National Health System, with an alternative private practice
available, flts in our description. And it does so irrespective of supplemen-
tary health insurance contracted by patients. Also, private health plans
that deflne preferred providers, to which the patient pays nothing (full in-
surance), and \outside" providers, to which some copayment is due, falls
within our stylized framework.
Anyhow, for exposition purposes, we refer to s as the treatment fee.
The fee s is chosen by an outside institution, in accordance to the particular
setting considered.
We model physicians’ behavior as that of a single representative agent.
We call this agent \the doctor." She works both in the public sector, by
treating patients in the public hospital (in the morning, say) and in the
private hospital (in the afternoon, say). The private and public practice
may even be in the same hospital, under difierent types of contracts.
The only assumption we need in reference to doctor’s preferences is the
following.
Assumption 3 If the doctor is willing to treat, in her private practice, a
patient with severity m0, then she is also willing to treat any patient with
severity m • m0.
This assumption implies the following statement: \the cost of treating
a patient with severity m0 is higher than the cost of treating a patient with
severity m < m0 (even if ¿(m0) < ¿(m))." Thus, an implicit assumption is
that treating more complex problems involves the use of more sophisticated
resources. The use of such more sophisticated resources is more costly to
the doctor (either in time he devotes to the case or the attention and skills
required). If doctors are selflsh and receive a °at fee per patient treated,
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then the statement and Assumption 3 are equivalent. If doctors care for
patient’s welfare, then Assumption 3 requires that the cost of treating a pa-
tient increases with m su–ciently fast and/or the fee per treatment increases
with m su–ciently slow.11
More importantly, Assumption 3 implies that, on the part of the doctor,
the only relevant decision is the choice of the maximum level of severity
she is willing to treat privately, which we denote by mmax. Once mmax is
chosen, all patients with illness severity up to mmax are ofiered the private
treatment.
The timing of moves is as follows. First, third-party payers and/or the
doctor set the fee s > 0, taken exogenously here.12 Some institution (e.g.,
the public payer or the college of medicine), which we refer to as the ad-
ministration, flxes the criteria for admittance into the public waiting list.
Namely, a cutofi value bm < m is chosen so that all patients with severity
m 2 [bm;m] are admitted to the public waiting list. The value bm fully de-
scribes the rationing policy. This divides the population into two groups,
the more severe (Group A - for \accepted"- from now on) and the less severe
cases (group B from now on).
The doctor then chooses mmax. The following terminology will be used
throughout.
Deflnition 1 If bm > 0 we say that the access to the public hospital is
rationed.
The last movers are the patients. We concentrate our analysis on group
A. Since we have assumed that patients are atomistic, they take waiting
time as exogenous when they decide whether to leave the public system and
choose the private care option. Since patients are perfectly informed about
the environment, their expectation on waiting time in the public system and
11Notice that if Assumption 3 was not satisfled, then the concept of \cream-skimming"
would be meaningless.
12If s is a copayment, it is usually set by the third-party payer. If it is a full payment
in private practice, it is set by the doctor.
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the true value coincide in equilibrium.13 The timing of the game implies
that the doctor acts as Stackelberg leader on patients’ choices, while the
administration acts as a Stackelberg leader on the doctor’s choice of mmax
and all the patients’ choices. The administration choice of the rationing
policy is not explicitly modelled.
We simplify the analysis by assuming that the waiting time for recovery
in the non-hospital treatment is so lengthy that those admitted in the public
service will never consider it. Namely, we assume that t > T (m) so that
c(t;m) + s0 ‚ c(t;m) for all t in the interval [0; T (m)] and for all m in
[0;m]. That is, even if the public waiting time presents its ever possible
maximum (t = T (m)) any patient in group A prefers the public service to
the alternative treatment (strictly, if m < 0). Hence, patients in group A
choose between the public treatment and the private treatment.14
Given waiting time t, a patient with severity m will prefer the public
sector if the cost of waiting is lower than the fee s to be paid in the private
sector. Since the cost of waiting is increasing in the severity level (and it
is zero for m = 0 by Assumption 2), then it exists a unique treshold value
such that for severity levels above it, the patient chooses to go to the private
sector, and below it stays in the public-sector waiting list. This cutofi point is
given by c(t;mc) = s. We call the patient with condition mc the \indifierent
patient". Without loss of generality, we assume that the indifierent patient
stays in the waiting list.
The equilibrium is computed by solving the following system of equations
for mc and t.
c(t;mc) = s
t = T (m)¡ T (mmax) + min fmaxfT (mc); T (bm)g; T (mmax)g ¡ T (bm):
¾
(2)
The flrst equation deflnes the indifierent patient, as explained above. The
13It may seem somewhat heroic to assume perfect information by the patients. However,
it seems quite reasonable to say that patients do have an accurate estimate on waiting
times. This information may be conveyed by friends or word of mouth. This is the sense
in which we use the perfect information assumption.
14Note that, for flxed bm; the condition t > T (m)¡ T ( bm) is su–cient to guarantee that
patients in group A discard the non-hospital treatment.
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second equation deflnes waiting time as the sum of the lengths of intervals
served by the public sector. The apparently complex form of the second
equation is due to the need to account for difierent cases. Its utility will be
clear below.
The following deflnitions set up the basic terminology and help to fully
understand the second equation, by considering all relevant cases. Notice
flrst that the problem is interesting only if bm • mmax • m.
Deflnition 2
(a) If mc ‚ mmax, irrespectively of whether mc is above or below m,
then t = T (m) ¡ T (bm). We then say that the private sector is
inactive.
(b) If mc < mmax, then we say that the private sector is active;
moreover,
(b1) If mc < bm, then t = T (m) ¡ T (mmax) and we say that doctors
fully cream skim patients.
(b2) If bm • mc • mmax < m, then t = T (m) ¡ T (mmax) + T (mc) ¡
T (bm). The solution is interior and we say that doctors cream
skim patients only partially.
(b3) If bm • mc • mmax = m, then we say that doctors do not
cream skim patients.
In case (a), all patients in group A who are ofiered private treatment
prefer the public sector. The private sector is therefore inactive. In case
(b), on the other hand, the private sector is active since mc < mmax andbm • mmax • m jointly imply that the interval of patients treated in this
sector, i.e., [maxfmc; bmg;mmax] is non-empty. In particular, in case (b1),
there exists a non-empty interval of patients [bm;mmax] who resort to the
private sector. Moreover, these patients present the least severe conditions
in group A. This is why we say that there is full cream skimming. However,
full cream skimming does not necessarily imply that all patients in group A
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are diverted to private practice, since mmax may be below m. In cases (b2)
and (b3) all the patients in the non-empty interval [bm;mc] reject the doctor’s
ofier to resort to the private sector. Note, moreover, that these patients
present the least-severe conditions. Therefore, they are the ones willing to
wait more time for treatment and save payment s. In case (b2), there is still
some patients (with m 2 [mmax;m]) who are rejected by the private sector,
so there is some degree of cream skimming. In case (b3), on the other hand,
the private sector only treats the most severe cases and looses the mildest
cases, so there is no cream skimming. Notice that cases (a), (b1), (b2) and
(b3) are mutually exclusive and exhaustive given bm • mmax • m.
Since @c=@m > 0 and @c=@t > 0, the flrst equation in (2) deflnes a
strictly decreasing schedule in the space (mc; t), whereas the second equation
is increasing in mc. Thus, the system yields at most a unique solution, which
we denote by [mc(mmax); t(mmax)]. To ensure existence of this solution we
make the following technical assumption.
Assumption 4 For any c > 0, c(t;m) = c implies that t! 0 as m!1.
In other words, the level curves of the waiting cost function have a horizontal
asymptote at zero, Intuitively, we want to ensure that, if the waiting time
is strictly positive, we can make the cost of waiting arbitrarily large by
choosing a su–ciently severe condition.15
Figure 1 illustrates equations system (2), where we have depicted both
equations in the (mc; t) space for the case when the solution is interior (i.e.,
in case (b2), where bm < mc(mmax) • mmax < m).
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 can be used to illustrate some comparative statics on the op-
timal patients’ decisions. Interpret the loci c(t;mc) = s (the flrst equa-
tion in (2)) as the demand curve for public health, where waiting time
15Equivalently, we want to rule out the possibility that, for a flxed and positive level
of waiting cost c there exists some positive waiting length t0 such that, no matter how
bad the medical condition is, waiting costs are always lower than c. Notice that this
assumption is compatible with Assumption 2.
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plays the role of the price for public treatment. Similarly, interpret the loci
t = T (m) ¡ T (mmax) + min fmaxfT (mc); T (bm)g; T (mmax)g ¡ T (bm) as the
supply of public health care (as one allows for longer waiting times, the
public sector is able to treat a larger segment of patients). An increase in s
(keeping the other parameters flxed) induces an upward shift in the demand
schedule. Thus, a larger fee results in a larger level of severity for the indif-
ferent consumer (so fewer patients are diverted to the private sector) and a
higher waiting time (because the waiting list is longer). On the other hand,
an increase in mmax induces a right shift of the supply curve. This results in
a shorter wait and again a higher severity of the marginal consumer. This
means that the segment of patients treated in the private sector shifts up.16
These comparative statics refer to the patient’s decision only. Full equi-
librium comparative statics require positing a speciflc functional form for
the doctor’s objective function. As we opted for keeping the analysis at a
general level, no further comparative statics results are reported.
The doctor chooses mmax ‚ bm taking into account that her decision
will afiect the calling population for the public waiting list. The following
lemmata will be useful later on. They give some properties of the solution
(mc(mmax); t(mmax)).
Lemma 1 The equilibrium value for mc, that is, mc(mmax), does not de-
crease with mmax.
The lemma establishes that if doctors set a higher value for the maximum
severity level that they are willing to treat in the private sector, then the
indifierent patient will also have a higher severity level. As mmax increases,
waiting time decreases, and the patients with mildest conditions will be more
willing to wait for free treatment.
Lemma 2 If bm < mc(mmax) < mmax, then
16We address the comparative statics of changes of mmax on the length (rather than
the position) of that segment later on, when we give the derivative of the equilibrium
mc(mmax) with respect to mmax.
15
0 < mc0(mmax) =
@c
@t ¿(m
max)
@c
@m +
@c
@t ¿(m
c(mmax))
:
A su–cient condition formc
0
(mmax) < 1 is that ¿(mc(mmax)) ‚ ¿(mmax).
That mc
0
(mmax) < 1 means that an increase in mmax triggers a less than
proportional change in the severity level of the indifierent patient. In other
words, an increase in mmax enlarges the set of patients treated in private
practice whenever mc
0
< 1.
Let us explain, using the discrete case version of our model, why mc
0
may be larger than one. Suppose that mmax is already far apart from mc
(perhaps because the doctor’s fee per service is quite high). Suppose now
that the doctor privately attends the next patient to the right of the most
severe case in her private practice (i.e., mmax increases). Suppose also that
the service time of this additional patient is extremely lengthy. Waiting
time in the public sector is so greatly reduced that not only the patient who
(before the change) was indifierent between sectors now prefers to wait, but
also the two patients to his right may also prefer to wait.
It turns out that we can characterize with great detail the cream-skimming
conditions in the health sector without having to flnd the explicit solution
of the doctor’s decision problem (the optimal mmax).
This feature of the model allows us to avoid a detailed discussion on
either the health production technology or the preferences of doctors. In
particular, the qualitative results emerging from our analysis are robust
to a variety of objective functions of doctors. Our approach encompasses
both fully self-centered utility functions, according to which the doctor cares
only about own rewards, as well as altruistic utility functions, in which a
considerable weight may be attached to patient’s welfare.
In order to characterize the extent of cream-skimming in equilibrium, it
is flrst necessary to study the attitudes of patients towards potential ofiers
of private practice when the private sector is inactive.
Whenever the private sector does not operate, the public waiting list
presents its maximum length t = T (m) ¡ T (bm). The system of equations
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(2) reduces to
c(T (m)¡ T (bm);mc) = s
t = T (m)¡ T (bm).
¾
(3)
Denote by em(bm) the solution for mc in this case. Thus, em(bm) is the severity
level of the consumer indifierent between being the flrst to go to the private
practice and staying in the waiting list. In particular, for all mmax • em(bm),
the private sector is inactive and mc(mmax) is constant and equal to em(bm).
The question to be solved is what happens if mmax > em(bm). The following
lemma is quite intuitive and it will be useful later on.
Lemma 3 If mmax > em(bm), then mc(mmax) < mmax.
Although an increase in scope of severities treated in the private sector
makes the public sector more attractive (since this reduces the public waiting
list), it is obvious that it can never be the case that this efiect is so large
that the private sector becomes inactive.
Deflne now `(bm) = c(T (m) ¡ T (bm); bm). That is, `(bm) is the cost of
waiting for the patient with the mildest condition admitted to the waiting
list when the waiting list is at its maximum, that is, when the private sector
is inactive.
Two cases are possible. In Case I, `(bm) • s. This implies that, even
when the public queue is at its maximum length, the individual with the
mildest condition in Group A (weakly) prefers the public sector. We then
say that the private sector is relatively unattractive. This in turn implies
that the severity of the individual who is indifierent between the two sectors
must be higher than or equal to bm. To sum up, em(bm) ‚ bm.
In Case II, `(bm) > s. This implies that, the individual with mildest
condition in Group A strictly prefers the private sector when the waiting
list is at its maximum. We then say that the private sector is relatively at-
tractive. This implies that the individual who is indifierent between sectors
must have a severity below bm. In other words, em(bm) < bm.
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We now deal with each of the two cases in more detail. In the flrst case,
the flrst patient indifierent between public and private practice has a severity
level higher than the critical threshold for admission into the public waiting
list. We will show that only partial cream-skimming is possible in this
case, no matter what the optimal decision of doctors regarding divertion of
patients to public practice is. In the second case, the flrst patient indifierent
between public and private practice has severity level below the admission
threshold. Cream-skimming can be full or partial, depending on doctors’
choice of the maximal level of severity they are willing to treat in the private
sector. We now show these two claims.
2.1 Case I { The private sector is relatively unattractive
The next lemma provides su–cient conditions ensuring that we are in Case
I (which occurs for em(bm) ‚ bm).
Lemma 4 There exist bm⁄, bm⁄⁄ in the open interval (0;m) such that `(bm) •
s, and therefore em(bm) ‚ bm for all bm 2 [0; bm⁄] [ [bm⁄⁄;m].
This lemma states that there is a range of values for the threshold valuebm such that private practice is not attractive for the patient with the mildest
condition giving access to the waiting list. Patients will never accept pro-
posals of moving from the public list to immediate private treatment. For
this to happen, either bm must be su–ciently small or su–ciently high.
The following proposition is quite straightforward and it is one of the
important results in the paper.
Proposition 1 If the admission to the public sector waiting list is either
too lenient or too strict, then doctors can cream skim patients only partially.
Technically, the proposition can be restated as: if bm is su–ciently small
(bm • m⁄⁄) or su–ciently high (bm ‚ m⁄⁄), then, no matter what mmax
doctors choose in [bm;m], either the private sector is inactive or, if the pri-
vate sector is active, doctors can cream-skim patients only partially. In
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particular, for all bm • mmax • em(bm), the private sector is inactive, so
mc(mmax) = em(bm) (which is independent of mmax). On the other hand,
for all em(bm) < mmax • m, the private sector is active and mc0 is given in
Lemma 2.
Proof. Recall flrst that if bm is su–ciently small or su–ciently large,
then em(bm) ‚ bm by Lemma 4. Suppose flrst that bm • mmax • em(bm). Then
the private sector is inactive, and mc(mmax) = em(bm), independent of mmax.
Suppose now that em(bm) < mmax < m. Then, by Lemma 1, mc(mmax) <
mmax and the private sector is active. This implies that t(mmax) < T (m)¡
T (bm).
Now, since by deflnition c(tmmax);mc(mmax)) = c(T (m)¡T (bm); em(bm)) =
s, then the last inequality implies that mc(mmax) > em(bm): To sum up, we
have bm < em(bm) < mc(mmax) < mmax • m. That is, cream skimming is
only partial and Lemma 2 applies. ¥
Intuitively, if bm is su–ciently small (bm < m⁄), that is, the rationing into
the waiting list is lenient, patients with a mild condition are admitted into
the waiting list. These patients being ofiered the option of private treatment
will choose to stay in the waiting list. Their relatively good condition ensures
that cost of waiting is smaller than the fee to be paid to private practice.
On the other hand, for bm su–ciently large (bm > m⁄⁄), that is, for a strict
admission rule to the waiting list, only high-severity patients will be in the
public sector. Thus, waiting time will be small, which decreases the relative
attractiveness of the private sector. Patients are in this case more willing to
wait to save the fee s, as the wait is not long.
The intuition is illustrated in Figure 2. Lemmata 3 and 1 are re°ected in
the fact that mc(mmax) is increasing in mmax but it never hits the 45 degree
line.
[Figure 2 about here]
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2.2 Case II. The private sector is relatively attractive
At the current level of generality, we cannot provide su–cient conditions to
ensure that Case II occurs (em(bm) < bm). In the remainder we assume that
`(bm) > s holds and characterize how the degree of cream skimming depends
on the doctor’s decision on mmax.
In this case, bm > em(bm), and it turns out that the behavior of the
function mc(mmax) is quite difierent depending on whether mc(mmax) is
above or below bm, except for the following lemma.
Lemma 5 In Case II, the equilibrium mc(mmax) is a strictly increasing
function of mmax in [bm;m]. Otherwise, for mmax • bm, there is no private
practice.
The intuition in this lemma is the same as the one in Lemma 1. The
difierence is that, in Lemma 1, mmax could take any value, including the val-
ues in the segment [0;maxfbm; em(bm)g] where there is no scope for an active
private sector. Consequently, mc(mmax) is constant instead of increasing.
In Lemma 5, on the other hand, when we restrict attention to the case when
mmax > em, then bm > em(bm) (since we are in Case II), and the private sector
is active.
We can now state another important result in the paper.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique threshold value for mmax (the maxi-
mum severity patient a doctor wants to treat) such that:
a) if the doctor’s choice is below this threshold, the private sector is active
and conducts full cream skimming;
b) if the doctor’s choice is above (or equal to) this threshold, the private
sector is active and in equilibrium cream-skimming is only partial.
Technically, there exists a unique mmax0 in the open interval (bm;m), such
that
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(i) For all bm • mmax < mmax0 , the private sector is active and conducts
full cream skimming. Moreover,
mc0(mmax) =
@c=@t
@c=@m
¢ ¿(mmax) > 0
(ii) For all mmax0 • mmax • m, the private sector is active and conducts
cream skimming that is only partial. Moreover, mc0(mmax) is given in
Lemma 1.
Proof. Suppose flrst that mmax = bm. Then no private sector exists and
mc(mmax) = mc(bm) = em(bm) < bm, since we are in Case II. Suppose now
that mmax = m. We show now that mc(m) > bm.
Suppose, by contradiction, that mc(m) • bm. Then, using the second
equation in (2), we have t = 0 and, by the deflnition of mc(mmax); we have
that c(0;mc(m)) = s > 0. This contradicts Assumption 2.
To sum up, mc(bm) < bm while mc(m) > bm. Since mc(mmax) is contin-
uous and strictly increasing in [bm;m] (by Lemma 5), there exists a unique
value mmax0 in (bm;m) satisfying
mc(mmax)
8<:
< bm for all mmax in [bm;mmax0 ), i.e., full cream-skimming;
= bm for mmax = mmax0 , i.e., partial cream-skimming;
> bm for all mmax in (mmax0 ;m] i.e., partial cream-skimming.
Now, for mmax in [bm;mmax0 ), the total waiting time is
t = T (m)¡ T (mmax);
since
mc(mmax) < bm • mmax:
Therefore, c(T (m) ¡ T (mmax);mc(mmax)) · s. The proof of part (i) is
completed by difierentiating this identity with respect to mmax.
For mmax in (mmax0 ;m], we have bm < mc(mmax) < mmax, and Lemma 1
applies.¥
The content of this Proposition is illustrated in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here]
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3 Extensions
In this section we address two particular questions that have not been treated
in our rather general approach. The flrst one is the determination of the
average severity treated in each sector. The second one is the efiects of
prioritization.
3.1 Average severity
A typical criticism to waiting lists and divertion of patients to private prac-
tice is that only the best cases are captured by the private sector. The
public waiting list then keeps all the complex (and costly) situations. We
have shown this is not necessarily the case. But it could be that on aver-
age, even if cream skimming is only partial, severity mix is lower in private
practice than in public pratice.
The attractiveness of thinking in terms of average severity is that it
provides simple empirically testable implications. Unfortunately, one cannot
state, in general, that average severity of cases treated is higher (or lower)
in the public sector. That is, when one keeps the supply-side analysis of
the waiting list at a general level, no precise prediction can be made on the
relative position of average case mix in private and public sectors if partial
cream skimming emerges in equilibrium.
We show this claim by way of a numerical example. Take the utility
function to be:
U = A¡ tm: (4)
Let service time be constant on m and equal to 1. Take m = 1. That is,
T (z) = z. The flrst equation in (2), deflning the indifierent patient, mc,
between staying in the waiting list or going to the private practice becomes
s = tmc.
First, it is easy to check that we are in the interior case.17 Therefore,
17To see this, it su–ces to check that we are in Case I, or equivalently, that c(T (m) ¡
T ( bm); bm) < s. This is straightforward by substitution.
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the waiting time is given by
t = mc ¡ bm+ 1¡mmax: (5)
Solving (3) and (4), the equilibrium value mc is deflned implicitly by
s = (mc + 1¡ bm¡mmax)mc: (6)
Take the cost of treating patient with severity m as k(m) = fim. The doctor
is assumed to care only about self-interest.18 Hence, his problem is given
by:
max
fmmaxg
V = s(mmax ¡mc)¡ fi
Z mmax
mc
mdm: (7)
The flrst-order condition for this problem is
@V
@mmax
= s¡ fimmax ¡ (s¡ fimc) @m
c
@mmax
= 0: (8)
Straightforward substitutions yield that the equilibrium values of mc and
mmax solve the following two equations:
(s¡ fimmax)(2mc ¡ bm+ 1¡mmax) = (s¡ fimc)mc;
s = mc(mc ¡ bm+ 1¡mmax):
Take now the following set of parameters (bm = 0:25; s = 0:55;fi = 0:55).
The numerical solution yields (mc = 0:821;mmax = 0:902). The average
severity level in the public sector is 0.555 and in the private sector is 0.861.
Thus, it is not true that, in general and on average, the private practice
treats the mildest cases. The reverse is not true either. Change the private
sector fee to s = 0:25. That is, resorting to the private sector becomes
cheaper. The new equilibrium values are (mc = 0:362;mmax = 0:423).19
Computation of average severity level gives a value of 0.645 in the public
18This is more restrictive than what we assumed above. However, to obtain an explicit
solution, some assumption about the utility function of doctors is needed. We take the
assumption that is the least favorable for cream-skimming to be only partial.
19It is easy to check, again, that c(T (m)¡ T ( bm); bm) < s.
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sector and 0.393 in the private sector. Both examples exhibit partial cream
skimming.
Thus, a priori, under partial cream skimming (case b2) we cannot state
whether, on average, we should flnd easier cases in private practice, or not.
This will be essentially an empirical matter. On the other hand, we know
that average severity is higher in the public sector than in the private sector
under full cream skimming (case b1), while the opposite is true under no
cream skimming (case b3).
However, we believe that the questions that we are able to address, i.e.,
what is the condition of those patients that are rejected by the private sector
and what is the condition of those patients who reject the private sector, are
truly interesting. After all, it is quite di–cult to observe average severity.
That is why most accusations of cream skimming are based on the exclusion
of certain cases by the private sector. This is exactly the issue that we have
addressed here.
3.2 Prioritization
We have restricted our analysis to flrst-come/flrst-served waiting lists. One
of the reasons, as explained in the introduction, is that prioritization criteria
vary widely form instance to instance. We can however derive some impli-
cations of our model that could be useful for the prioritization discussion,
by considering a simple case of prioritization by severity, in the spirit of case
(iii) in Goddard and Tavakoli (1994).
Suppose that the administration flxes a second cutofi value bbm in the
closed interval [bm;m] such that all patients in the segment [bm; bbm] are treated
last (while keeping the flrst-come/flrst-served rule in both [bm; bbm] and [bbm;m]).
Then, we can repeat the same previous analysis for the segment [bbm;m]; just
replace bm by bbm everywhere. (Notice that if bbm is close to mmax then most of
the individuals in [bbm;m] are not ofiered private treatment and therefore stay
in the waiting list.) The question is what happens in the segment [bm; bbm].
Perhaps in the world without prioritization these individuals would have
stayed in the waiting list by rejecting the private ofier, since they were in
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mild condition and were not relegated to the end of the line. With priori-
tization, these individuals are forced to wait for a much longer time. They
will now most probably accept the private ofier. Thus, we can say that
prioritization may reinforce cream-skimming practices.
Again, this discussion is made just for illustrative purposes. Prioritiza-
tion may take much more complicated forms and be based on other criteria
other than severity, like age, economic status, or prognosis (among many
others). Each form will lead to very difierent cream-skimming outcomes.
Any productive analysis will have to be made on a case-by-case basis.
4 Final remarks
We close the paper by stating once more our main contribution. We have put
together doctors’ and patients’ decisions, and have asked to what extent are
doctors able to cream skim patients. That is, we have taken a positive rather
than a normative approach. Using a quite general model (most notably,
without almost no restriction on doctors’ preferences or on queueing pro-
cesses), we have been able to characterize the equilibrium cream-skimming
outcome.
The main conclusion is that, under quite general conditions, one should
not observe full cream skimming (where all the mildest cases end up being
treated in the private sector, while the worst cases remain in the waiting
list). Instead, one should see a partial cream-skimming regime, under which
doctors treat patients with an intermediate range of illness severities in their
private practice. These conditions are that the rationing policy be either
su–ciently lenient or su–ciently strict, where by rationing policy we mean
the admission criteria applied to the public waiting list, and that patients
pay a °at fee per service (independent of the level of severity) when resorting
to the private sector. The full cream-skimming outcome is only compatible
(if at all) with intermediate rationing policies.
The main intuition is straightforward. Although doctors may have an
incentive to ofier their services (in their private practice) to the lowest seg-
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ment of severity, only the more severe in this subgroup are willing to accept
to paying for private treatment. The rest will reject the private sector’s
ofier. This intuition is reinforced whenever the rationing policy is either
very lenient or very strict. In the flrst case, there are many patients in the
waiting list in mild condition. In the second case, the waiting list is so short
that only the extremely severe cases will accept the private sector’s ofier. If,
on the other hand, the rationing policy is intermediate, the fact that waiting
list is quite long and the fact that patients who are admitted are in quite
severe condition jointly imply that even the mildest cases admitted in the
waiting list opt for private treatment. We observe full cream skimming in
this case.
There are some issues that we have not addressed in this paper. First
of all, our model of the demand side is fairly simple. Our analysis is to
be seen as complementary to the work of several other contributors to this
literature, namely, Iversen (1997), Goddard, Malek and Tavakoli (1995), and
the references in the survey by Cullis, Jones and Propper (forthcoming).
In addition, we have not addressed the interesting issue of the role of
difierent remuneration schemes and rationing policies on doctor’s choices,
and the impact of these choices on the size and composition of the waiting
list.
This analysis would be a necessary flrst step to determine the optional
rationing policy, which we have taken as given. Notice, however, that this
endeavour would require positing a speciflc preference proflle on the part
of doctors. This would have reduced the level of generality that we have
been able to maintain throughout our analysis. In fact, we have shown
that one can bypass the study of doctor’s choices when characterizing to a
large extent the composition of the waiting list. We consider this to be an
important lesson of our approach.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
To show our claim, we will use the following facts.
Fact 1: 8x; y 2 R;minfx; 0g < minfy; 0g implies that x < y.
To see this, if x • 0 and y • 0 (case 1), the implication follows directly.
If x • 0 while y > 0 (case 2), then minfx; 0g < minfy; 0g implies that
x < 0. Therefore, x < 0 < y. If x > 0 and y • 0 (case 3), then minfx; 0g <
minfy; 0g implies that 0 < y, which contradicts y • 0. Thus, case 3 is
impossible. If x > 0 and y > 0 (case 4), then minfx; 0g < minfy; 0g implies
that 0 < 0, an impossibility. Hence, also case 4 is impossible.
Fact 2: 8x; y; r; s 2 R; if x > r and y > s then maxfx; yg > maxfr; sg.
To see this, if x ‚ y and r ‚ s (case 1) then maxfx; yg = x and
maxfr; sg = r, and the implication follows directly. If x • y and r • s (case
2), then again the implication follows directly. If x ‚ y and r • s (case 3),
then maxfx; yg = x ‚ y > s = maxfr; sg; and the implication is proved. If
x • y and r ‚ s (case 4), then maxfx; yg = y ‚ x > r = maxfr; sg; and
again the implication is proved.
Let’s now proceed to the proof of the lemma. Suppose, by contradiction,
that there exists 0 < a < b < bm such that mc(a) > mc(b). Then the
following statements hold:
(i) T (a) < T (b);
(ii) T (mc(a)) > T (mc(b))
(iii) t(a) < t(b), since by the flrst equation in (2),
c(t(a);mc(a)) = c(t(b);mc(b)) = s;
while mc(a) > mc(b).
Using the second equation in (2), and rearranging terms, (iii) can be
rewritten as
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(iii’) min fmax fT (mc(a))¡ T (a); T (bm)¡ T (a)g ; 0g <
< min fmax fT (mc(b))¡ T (b); T (bm)¡ T (b)g ; 0g
Using Fact 1, this can still be rewritten as
(iii") max fT (mc(a))¡ T (a); T (bm)¡ T (a)g <
< max fT (mc(b))¡ T (b); T (bm)¡ T (b)g :
Now, (i) and (ii) imply
(iv) T (mc(a))¡ T (a) > T (mc(b))¡ T (b);
(v) T (bm)¡ T (a) > T (bm)¡ T (b).
Fact 2 tell us that (iv), (v) and (iii") are incompatible. The lemma fol-
lows. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2:
Substitute the expression for t given in the second equation of (2) into
the flrst equation, and difierentiate totally with respect to mmax.¥
Proof of Lemma 3:
We prove the counterpositive. Suppose that mc(mmax) ‚ mmax. Then
min fmaxfT (mc(mmax)); T (bm)g; T (mmax)g = T (mmax), and t = T (m) ¡
T (bm) (the private sector is not active). Therefore, by deflnition, mc(mmax) =em(bm). Therefore mmax • em(bm).¥
Proof of Lemma 4:
By continuity, it su–ces to show that `(0) • s and that `(m) • s.
By Assumption 2, `(0) = c(T (m) ¡ T (0); 0) = 0 and `(m) = c(T (m) ¡
T (m);m) = c(0;m) = 0: ¥
Proof of Lemma 5:
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist bm • a < b • m such that
mc(a) ‚ mc(b). Then, the following statements hold:
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(i) T (bm) • T (a) < T (b) < T (m);
(ii) mc(a) • a;mc(b) < b since b > a ‚ bm > embm, so Lemma 3 applies;
(iii) T (mc(a)) < T (a); T (mc(b) < T (b), by (ii);
(iv) T (mc(a)) ‚ T (mc(b)).
(v) Since by deflnition c(t(a);mc(a)) = c(t(b);mc(b) = s, we have t(a) •
t(b).
Use (iv) and (v) and apply (iii) to get
(vi) T (mc(b))¡ T (b) < T (mc(a))¡ T (a) < 0.
Use (i) to get (vii) T (bm)¡ T (b) < T (bm)¡ T (a) < 0.
Use (vi) and (vii) to rewrite (v) as
minfmaxfT (mc(a)¡ T (a); T (bm)¡ T (a)g; 0g •
• minfmaxfT (mc(b))¡ T (b); T (bm)¡ T (b)g; 0g
or
(v’) maxfT (mc(a) ¡ T (a); T (bm) ¡ T (a)g • maxfT (mc(b)) ¡ T (b); T (bm) ¡
T (b)g
The contradiction comes from (v’), (vi) and (vii), which are incompati-
ble, by fact 2 in the proof of Lemma 1. ¥
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Figure 1. The equilibrium waiting time
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